

PRESS RELEASE

Senators Coons, Graham, Murphy, Rubio introduce bipartisan legislation to support peaceful resolution to Libyan conflict

NOVEMBER 21, 2019

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced legislation to clarify and strengthen U.S. policy in support of a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya.

The *Libya Stabilization Act* would place sanctions on individuals fueling violence in the country, require a report on foreign government involvement, and require a strategy to counter Russian influence. The bill would also marshal U.S. resources, including humanitarian assistance, to support the Libyan people and an eventual unified Libyan government.

“The conflict in Libya is a humanitarian crisis that continues to fuel instability and present opportunities for extremist groups in the region,” **said Senator Coons**. “The United States should play a constructive role in ending the war and stemming the regional and international repercussions of the violence. My hope is that the bipartisan *Libya Stabilization Act* will strengthen the Administration’s efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution in Libya and signal to parties on the ground that the United States is committed to supporting peace and stability for the Libyan people.”

“I am pleased to be a part of this bipartisan effort to focus on a peaceful solution to the conflict in Libya,” **said Senator Graham**. “Our goal is to prevent the Libyan conflict from spreading and allowing the entire region to become breeding ground for terrorists. I appreciate Senator Coons’ hard work and am glad to join him in this effort to end the conflict and promote stability for the Libyan people.”

“Absent sustained engagement by the United States, the security vacuum in Libya will continue to give space to operate for terrorists and extremists and deepen the country’s humanitarian crisis,” **said Senator Murphy**. “The *Libya Stabilization Act* will telegraph to the world that the United States is committed to achieving peace in the country, and that we’re ready to hold Khalifa Haftar or any bad actors who seek to fuel violence accountable.”

“It is in America’s, and our allies’ interest, to have a stable and secure Libya. That is why we should be actively engaged in working to foster a resolution to the ongoing conflict,” **Senator Rubio said**. “This bill is an important step in holding accountable those actors, both domestic and foreign, who are destabilizing Libya and supporting a diplomatic solution to the conflict as well as the Libyan people.”

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To clarify United States policy toward Libya, advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya, and support the people of Libya.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. COONS (for himself, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To clarify United States policy toward Libya, advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya, and support the people of Libya.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Libya Stabilization Act”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings; statement of policy.

TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO STABILITY IN LIBYA

2

Sec. 101. Codification of Executive Order 13726.

Sec. 102. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Libya.

Sec. 103. Strategy to counter Russian influence in Libya.

TITLE II ACTIONS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

Sec. 201. Definitions.

Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons supporting Russian military intervention in Libya.

Sec. 203. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons threatening the peace or stability of Libya.

Sec. 204. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed in Libya.

Sec. 205. Sanctions described.

Sec. 206. Waiver; exceptions.

Sec. 207. Implementation; regulations; penalties.

Sec. 208. Termination.

TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYA

Sec. 301. Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international refugees and migrants in Libya.

Sec. 302. Support for democratic governance, elections, and democratic civil society.

Sec. 303. Engaging international financial institutions to advance Libyan economic recovery and improve public sector financial management.

Sec. 304. Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people.

Sec. 305. Special envoy for Libya.

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
3 ings:

4 (1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya
5 is critical to the security of the United States, Eu-
6 rope, North Africa, and the Sahel, as well as mari-
7 time routes in the southern Mediterranean Sea.

8 (2) General Thomas Waldhauser, former Com-
9 mander of United States Africa Command
10 (AFRICOM), told the Committee on Armed Services
11 of the Senate in March 2017, that “instability in

1 Libya and North Africa may be the most significant,
2 near-term threat to U.S. and allies' interests on the
3 continent".

4 (3) AFRICOM identifies containing instability
5 in Libya as one of its six main lines of effort in Afri-
6 ca and works to support diplomatic efforts to recon-
7 stitute the Libyan state and to disrupt terrorist or-
8 ganizations that impede that process or threaten
9 United States interests.

10 (4) According to the Director of National Intel-
11 ligence, as of 2019, the capabilities of the Libya-
12 based Islamic State (ISIS) affiliate "have been de-
13 graded, but it is still capable of conducting attacks
14 on local and Western targets in Libya and possibly
15 elsewhere in the region". According to United Na-
16 tions Special Representative of the Secretary Gen-
17 eral (SRSG) Ghassan Salamé, ISIS has conducted
18 several attacks since April 4, 2019.

19 (5) On September 22, 2016, a Joint Commu-
20 nique on Libya, signed by Egypt, Italy, Qatar, Rus-
21 sia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emir-
22 ates, and others, reaffirmed a joint "commitment to
23 the United Nations Support Mission in Libya's
24 [UNSMIL] efforts under the leadership of the UN
25 Special Representative of the Secretary General".

1 (6) On March 1, 2019, the United States Gov-
2 ernment, along with the Governments of France,
3 Italy, and the United Kingdom, reiterated its strong
4 support to the diplomatic efforts of SRSF Ghassan
5 Salamé and UNSMIL, rejected a military solution in
6 Libya, and called on all Libyans to work construc-
7 tively with SRSF Salamé to realize a stable and uni-
8 fied government that can deliver security and pros-
9 perity for all Libyans.

10 (7) UNSMIL planned to host a long-awaited
11 National Conference in Ghadames, Libya to begin
12 on April 14, 2019, to help the people of Libya nego-
13 tiate a path toward interim governance structures
14 and credible and secure elections.

15 (8) On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the com-
16 mander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) move-
17 ment ordered forces loyal to him to begin a unilat-
18 eral military operation to take control of Tripoli, the
19 capital of Libya, while United Nations Secretary-
20 General Antonio Guterres was visiting Tripoli to
21 promote the National Conference.

22 (9) Tripoli is the seat of the Government of Na-
23 tional Accord (GNA), an interim body that emerged
24 from previous United Nations-backed negotiations
25 and that the United States Government and the

1 United Nations Security Council have recognized
2 since 2015.

3 (10) Although the LNA movement initiated the
4 offensive, all parties to the conflict and their associ-
5 ated forces have since April 2019 failed to observe
6 their obligations under international humanitarian
7 law and increased the geographic scope of the con-
8 flict, including by using heavy weapons, aircraft, and
9 armed drones provided by foreign powers in violation
10 of the United Nations arms embargo. Foreign mer-
11 cenaries have reportedly also participated in the con-
12 flict.

13 (11) Without the full cooperation of all United
14 Nations member states in implementing the arms
15 embargo in accordance with United Nations Security
16 Council Resolution 2473 (2019), and all relevant
17 predecessor resolutions, the flow of weapons to
18 Libya will continue to fuel the conflict.

19 (12) According to SRSG Salamé, weapons pro-
20 vided by foreign powers to the warring parties are
21 being sold to or captured by terrorist groups active
22 in Libya.

23 (13) According to the United Nations, since the
24 LNA movement offensive began in April 2019, the
25 conflict in Libya has led to the deaths of more than

1 1,100 people, including more than 100 civilians, and
2 the displacement of more than 120,000 people.

3 (14) Parties to the conflict in Libya have requi-
4 sitioned the houses of civilians, targeted medical fa-
5 cilities, and inhibited humanitarian access to food,
6 health, and other life-saving services, worsening hu-
7 manitarian conditions.

8 (15) More than 5,100 refugees and migrants
9 are detained in detention facilities in Libya, includ-
10 ing more than 3,000 in and around the conflict
11 zones in Tripoli, with serious risks of torture, star-
12 vation, sexual abuse, and death. On July 2, 2019, an
13 airstrike against the Tajura Detention Center killed
14 53 and wounded 130 people trapped in the center.
15 The United Nations has called for the immediate re-
16 lease, evacuation, and protection of refugees and mi-
17 grants detained in conflict zones.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
19 United States—

20 (1) to engage regularly at the senior-most levels
21 and assert there is no military solution to the con-
22 flict in Libya and that only a political process can
23 secure United States interests, ensure a stable and
24 unified Libya, reduce the threat of terrorism, and

1 provide peace and opportunity to the people of
2 Libya;

3 (2) to support the implementation of United
4 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011)
5 and 1973 (2011), which established an arms embar-
6 go on Libya, and subsequent resolutions modifying
7 and extending the embargo;

8 (3) to support the implementation of United
9 Nations Security Council Resolutions 2146 (2014)
10 and 2362 (2017), which condemn attempts to illic-
11 itly export petroleum and refined petroleum products
12 from Libya, including by parallel institutions which
13 are not acting under the authority of the Govern-
14 ment of National Accord;

15 (4) to promote unified and effective Libyan
16 oversight over the Libyan National Oil Corporation,
17 the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan Invest-
18 ment Authority;

19 (5) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed.
20 Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and sus-
21 pending entry into the United States of persons con-
22 tributing to the situation in Libya (April 19, 2016)),
23 designed to target individuals or entities who
24 “threaten the peace, security, and stability of
25 Libya”;

1 (6) to employ sanctions and support war-crimes
2 prosecution, against any and all parties engaging in
3 attacks on civilians, medical workers, and critical in-
4 frastructure, including water supplies, in Libya;

5 (7) to contribute to the peace and stability of
6 Libya, prevent destabilizing arms shipments, and
7 support efforts to safeguard Libya's oil resources in
8 accordance with United Nations Security Council
9 Resolutions 2259 (2015), 2278 (2016), 2362
10 (2017), and 2473 (2019);

11 (8) to leverage diplomatic relations to convince
12 the parties to the conflict in Libya to immediately
13 de-escalate and halt their current fighting and per-
14 suade foreign powers to stop providing weapons and
15 financing that exacerbate the conflict;

16 (9) to encourage the parties to promptly return
17 to a political process led by the SRSG and head of
18 UNSMIL;

19 (10) to support the United Nations-mediated
20 political process, which seeks a negotiated and
21 peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis;

22 (11) that a negotiated and peaceful political so-
23 lution should include a transitional, civilian-led gov-
24 ernment representing all Libyans, preparations for
25 credible elections, a fair and transparent allocation

1 of resources, interim security arrangements, and a
2 process to reunify security and economic institu-
3 tions;

4 (12) to support constant, unimpeded, and reli-
5 able humanitarian access to those in need and to
6 hold accountable those who impede or threaten the
7 delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8 (13) to advocate for the immediate release and
9 safe evacuations of detained refugees and migrants
10 trapped by the fighting in Libya;

11 (14) to assist implementation of UNSMIL's
12 plan for the organized and gradual closure of mi-
13 grant detention centers in Libya and ensure robust
14 protection assistance for refugees and migrants; and

15 (15) to support future democratic development
16 and the economic recovery of Libya both during and
17 after a negotiated and peaceful political solution.

18 **TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHAL-**
19 **LENGES TO STABILITY IN**
20 **LIBYA**

21 **SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13726.**

22 Notwithstanding any other provision of law or Execu-
23 tive order, Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559),
24 signed on April 19, 2016, and entitled “Blocking Property
25 and Suspending Entry into the United States of Persons

1 Contributing to the Situation in Libya” shall have the
2 force and effect of law.

3 **SEC. 102. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN**
4 **GOVERNMENTS AND ACTORS IN LIBYA.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
7 in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
8 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
9 a report that includes—

10 (1) a description of the full extent of involve-
11 ment in Libya by the Governments of Saudi Arabia,
12 Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey,
13 Sudan, Russia, the People’s Republic of China,
14 France, and Italy, including—

15 (A) a description of which governments are
16 linked to drone and aircraft strikes;

17 (B) the estimated dollar value and the
18 amounts of various types of equipment trans-
19 ferred to the warring parties; and

20 (C) an attribution of outside financial sup-
21 port provided to each reported presence of for-
22 eign forces and mercenaries in Libya;

23 (2) a determination and analysis of whether the
24 actions by the governments identified in paragraph
25 (1)—

1 (A) violate the arms embargo with respect
2 to Libya in accordance with United Nations Se-
3 curity Council Resolution 2473 (2019) and
4 predecessor Security Council resolutions; or

5 (B) contribute to civilian death, harm, or
6 other violations of international humanitarian
7 law;

8 (3) a list of the specific offending materiel or fi-
9 nancial support transfers that would be in violation
10 of the arms embargo with respect to Libya in ac-
11 cordance with United Nations Security Council Res-
12 olution 2473 (2019) and predecessor Security Coun-
13 cil resolutions;

14 (4) a determination and analysis of the activi-
15 ties of foreign armed groups, including affiliates of
16 the Islamic State (ISIS), al-Qaida in the Islamic
17 Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al-Sharia, in Libya;
18 and

19 (5) a determination of whether and to what ex-
20 tent the conflict in Libya is enabling the recruitment
21 and training efforts of armed groups, including af-
22 filiates of ISIS, AQIM, and Ansar al-Sharia.

23 (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
24 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
25 a classified annex.

1 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
3 sional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
5 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
6 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
8 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
9 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
10 Representatives.

11 **SEC. 103. STRATEGY TO COUNTER RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN**
12 **LIBYA.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
14 ings:

15 (1) In the 2019 “posture statement” to Con-
16 gress provided by General Thomas Waldhauser,
17 Commander of United States Africa Command
18 (AFRICOM), asserted that Russia was “invok[ing]
19 Qaddafi-era relationships and debts to obtain eco-
20 nomic and military contracts . . . aimed at access-
21 ing Libya’s vast oil market, reviving arms sales, and
22 gaining access to coastal territories”.

23 (2) Russia’s involvement in Libya and neigh-
24 boring countries is part of a larger regional strategy
25 to monitor the southern coastline of the North At-

1 lantic Treaty Organization (NATO), isolate Europe
2 from Africa, and exert control over the southern
3 Mediterranean Sea region.

4 (b) REPORT AND STRATEGY.—

5 (1) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
7 State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
8 the appropriate congressional committees a report
9 on—

10 (A) an assessment of Russian influence
11 and objectives in Libya;

12 (B) the potential threat such influence
13 poses to the United States, southern Europe,
14 and NATO operations in the Mediterranean
15 Sea;

16 (C) Russia's use of currency issuing and
17 printing; and

18 (D) Russia's use of mercenaries, military
19 contractors, and paramilitary forces in Libya.

20 (2) STRATEGY.—Not later than 30 days after
21 the date on which the report required by paragraph
22 (1) is submitted to the appropriate congressional
23 committees, the Secretary of State and the Secretary
24 of Defense shall brief the appropriate congressional

1 committees regarding a strategy to counter threats
2 identified in the report.

3 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
4 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
5 contain a classified annex.

6 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
7 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
8 propriate congressional committees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the
10 Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select
11 Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee
12 on Appropriations of the Senate; and

13 (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the
14 Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent
15 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
16 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
17 resentatives.

18 **TITLE II—ACTIONS TO ADDRESS**
19 **FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN**
20 **LIBYA**

21 **SEC. 201. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this title:

23 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED, ALIEN.—The terms
24 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the

1 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
2 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

3 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
5 mittees” means—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
7 the Committee on Financial Services of the
8 House of Representatives; and

9 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
10 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
11 Urban Affairs of the Senate.

12 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
13 son” means an individual or entity that is not a
14 United States person.

15 (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” with
16 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
17 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should
18 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
19 result.

20 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
21 “United States person” means—

22 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
23 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
24 United States; or

1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
3 United States, including a foreign branch of
4 such an entity.

5 **SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
6 **PERSONS SUPPORTING RUSSIAN MILITARY**
7 **INTERVENTION IN LIBYA.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180
9 days after the date on which the report required by section
10 102 is submitted to the appropriate congressional commit-
11 tees, the President shall impose the sanctions described
12 in section 205 with respect to a foreign person if the Presi-
13 dent determines that the foreign person, on or after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly engages in
15 an activity described in subsection (b).

16 (b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person en-
17 gages in an activity described in this subsection if the per-
18 son knowingly provides significant financial, material, or
19 technological support to, or knowingly engages in a signifi-
20 cant transaction with—

21 (1) a foreign person that is knowingly operating
22 in a military capacity in Libya for or on behalf of
23 the Government of the Russian Federation; or

24 (2) a foreign person that is a military con-
25 tractor, mercenary, or a paramilitary force know-

1 ingly operating in a military capacity in Libya for or
2 on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federa-
3 tion.

4 **SEC. 203. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
5 **PERSONS THREATENING THE PEACE OR STA-**
6 **BILITY OF LIBYA.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180
8 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
9 dent shall impose the sanctions described in section 205
10 with respect to a foreign person if the President deter-
11 mines that the person, on or after the date of the enact-
12 ment of this Act, knowingly engages in an activity de-
13 scribed in subsection (b).

14 (b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person en-
15 gages in an activity described in this subsection if the per-
16 son knowingly—

17 (1) is engaged in significant actions or policies
18 that threaten the peace, security, or stability of
19 Libya, including through the supply of arms or re-
20 lated materiel;

21 (2) is engaged in significant actions or policies
22 that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose
23 a significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delay-
24 ing, or impeding the United Nations-mediated polit-

1 ical process that seeks a negotiated and peaceful so-
2 lution to the Libyan crisis;

3 (3) is engaged in significant actions or policies
4 that may lead to or result in the misappropriation
5 of significant assets of the Government of Libya;

6 (4) is involved in, or has been involved in, the
7 significant illicit exploitation of crude oil or any
8 other natural resources in Libya, including the sig-
9 nificant illicit production, refining, brokering, sale,
10 purchase, or export of oil produced in Libya;

11 (5) is significantly threatening or coercing fi-
12 nancial institutions owned or controlled by the Gov-
13 ernment of Libya or the Libyan National Oil Com-
14 pany;

15 (6) is significantly responsible for actions or
16 policies that are intended to undermine—

17 (A) the United Nations-led political proc-
18 ess to end the conflict in Libya; or

19 (B) efforts to promote stabilization and
20 economic recovery in Libya;

21 (7) is significantly responsible for civilian cas-
22 ualties or violations of international humanitarian
23 law;

24 (8) is a successor entity to a person referred to
25 in any of paragraphs (1) through (7);

1 (9) owns or controls, or is owned or controlled
2 by, a person referred to in any of paragraphs (1)
3 through (7);

4 (10) is acting for or on behalf of a person re-
5 ferred to in any of paragraphs (1) through (7); or

6 (11) has provided, or attempted to provide, sig-
7 nificant financial, material, technological, or other
8 support for, or goods or services in support of, a
9 person referred to in any of paragraphs (1) through
10 (7).

11 **SEC. 204. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
12 **CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE**
13 **FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS**
14 **ABUSES COMMITTED IN LIBYA.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the
16 sanctions described in section 205 with respect to each for-
17 eign person on the list required by subsection (b).

18 (b) LIST OF PERSONS.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
21 President shall submit to the appropriate congres-
22 sional committees a list of foreign persons that the
23 President determines are knowingly responsible for
24 or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly en-
25 gaged in, serious human rights abuses and violations

1 of international humanitarian law committed in
2 Libya.

3 (2) UPDATES OF LIST.—The President shall
4 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
5 an updated list under paragraph (1)—

6 (A) not later than 180 days after the date
7 of the enactment of this Act and annually
8 thereafter until the date that is 5 years after
9 such date of enactment; or

10 (B) as new information becomes available.

11 (3) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1)
12 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may in-
13 clude a classified annex.

14 **SEC. 205. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**

15 The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a foreign
16 person under section 202, 203, or 204 are the following:

17 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
18 shall exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi-
19 dent by the International Emergency Economic
20 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that
21 the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50
22 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent nec-
23 essary to block and prohibit all transactions in prop-
24 erty and interests in property of the person if such
25 property and interests in property are in the United

1 States, come within the United States, or are or
2 come within the possession or control of a United
3 States person.

4 (2) INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INDIVID-
5 UALS.—

6 (A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION,
7 OR PAROLE.—An alien described in section 202,
8 203, or 204(b)(1) is—

9 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

10 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
11 documentation to enter the United States;
12 and

13 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
14 or paroled into the United States or to re-
15 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
16 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
17 seq.).

18 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

19 (i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described
20 in section 202, 203, or 204(b)(1) is subject
21 to revocation of any visa or other entry
22 documentation regardless of when the visa
23 or other entry documentation is or was
24 issued.

1 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
2 tion under clause (i) shall—

3 (I) take effect immediately; and

4 (II) automatically cancel any
5 other valid visa or entry documenta-
6 tion that is in the alien's possession.

7 **SEC. 206. WAIVER; EXCEPTIONS.**

8 (a) WAIVER.—The President, acting through the Sec-
9 retary of State, may waive the application of sanctions im-
10 posed with respect to a foreign person under this title if
11 the Secretary—

12 (1) determines that such a waiver is in the na-
13 tional interest of the United States; and

14 (2) not later than the date on which the waiver
15 takes effect, submits to the appropriate congres-
16 sional committees a notice of and justification for
17 the waiver.

18 (b) EXCEPTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
19 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Section 205(2) shall not apply
20 to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the
21 United States is necessary to permit the United States
22 to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters
23 of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,
24 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between

1 the United Nations and the United States, or other appli-
2 cable international obligations of the United States.

3 (c) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
4 GOODS.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and require-
6 ments to impose sanctions under this title shall not
7 include the authority or requirement to impose sanc-
8 tions on the importation of goods.

9 (2) GOOD DEFINED.—In this subsection, the
10 term “good” means any article, natural or man-
11 made substance, material, supply or manufactured
12 product, including inspection and test equipment
13 and excluding technical data.

14 **SEC. 207. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.**

15 (a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise
16 all authorities provided to the President under sections
17 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
18 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
19 title.

20 (b) REGULATIONS.—The President shall issue such
21 regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry
22 out this title.

23 (c) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to
24 violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
25 title or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry

1 out this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
2 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
3 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the
4 same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
5 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

6 **SEC. 208. TERMINATION.**

7 The requirement to impose sanctions under this title
8 shall terminate on December 31, 2024.

9 **TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR**
10 **LIBYA**

11 **SEC. 301. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
12 **LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEES AND**
13 **MIGRANTS IN LIBYA.**

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that—

16 (1) the United States Government should—

17 (A) expand efforts to address Libya’s hu-
18 manitarian crisis;

19 (B) leverage diplomatic relations with the
20 warring parties to guarantee constant, reliable
21 humanitarian access by frontline providers in
22 Libya;

23 (C) leverage diplomatic relations with the
24 warring parties, the United Nations, and the
25 European Union to ensure the release of vul-

1 nerable migrants and refugees from detention
2 centers and their voluntary safe passage from
3 the conflict zones in Libya; and

4 (D) expand efforts to document and pub-
5 licize violations of human rights and inter-
6 national humanitarian law and hold perpetra-
7 tors accountable; and

8 (2) humanitarian assistance to address the cri-
9 sis in Libya should be targeted toward those most
10 in need and delivered through partners that uphold
11 internationally recognized humanitarian principles.

12 (b) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the
14 United States Agency for International Develop-
15 ment, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is
16 authorized to provide humanitarian assistance to in-
17 dividuals and communities in Libya.

18 (2) INCLUDED ASSISTANCE.—Assistance au-
19 thorized by paragraph (1) shall include the following
20 to affected communities, including refugee and mi-
21 grant populations:

22 (A) Urgently needed health assistance, in-
23 cluding logistical and technical assistance to
24 hospitals, ambulances, and health clinics.

1 (B) Public health commodities and serv-
2 ices, including medicines and basic medical sup-
3 plies and equipment.

4 (C) Protection assistance for vulnerable
5 populations, including women, children, refu-
6 gees, and migrants.

7 (D) Other assistance, including food, shel-
8 ter, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), as
9 needed.

10 (E) Technical assistance to ensure health,
11 food, and commodities are appropriately se-
12 lected, procured, targeted, and distributed.

13 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
15 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
16 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
17 to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on
18 the following:

19 (1) How the United States Government, work-
20 ing with relevant foreign governments and multilat-
21 eral organizations, plans to address the humani-
22 tarian situation in Libya.

23 (2) How to leverage diplomatic and assistance
24 tools as well as strategic burden-sharing with inter-

1 national partners to improve the humanitarian situa-
2 tion in Libya.

3 (3) How to confront humanitarian access chal-
4 lenges and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.

5 (4) How to ensure protection for vulnerable ref-
6 ugees and migrants.

7 (5) How the United States will engage in diplo-
8 matic efforts to ensure support from international
9 donors, including foreign governments and multilat-
10 eral organizations.

11 (d) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
12 State, in consultation with the Administrator of the
13 United States Agency for International Development, shall
14 work with relevant foreign governments and multilateral
15 organizations to coordinate a high-level donor summit and
16 carry out diplomatic engagement to advance the provision
17 of humanitarian assistance to the people of Libya and
18 international migrants and refugees in Libya and carry
19 out the strategy required under subsection (c).

20 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
22 sional committees” means—

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
24 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
2 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
3 resentatives.

4 **SEC. 302. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, ELEC-**
5 **TIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SOCIETY.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
7 nation with the Administrator of the United States Agen-
8 cy for International Development, shall—

9 (1) work to help the people of Libya and a fu-
10 ture Libyan government unify Libyan financial and
11 governing institutions to deliver tangible results that
12 improve the lives of the Libyan people;

13 (2) work to ensure transparent, credible, and
14 inclusive future elections in Libya, including through
15 supporting electoral security and domestic and inter-
16 national election observation and by providing re-
17 lated training and technical assistance to institutions
18 with election-related responsibilities; and

19 (3) work with nongovernmental organizations—

20 (A) to strengthen democratic governance
21 and institutions, support decentralization, and
22 give the public a stronger voice in their govern-
23 ment;

24 (B) to increase public and stakeholder con-
25 fidence in Libya's electoral system;

1 (C) to defend internationally recognized
2 human rights for the people of Libya, including
3 support for efforts to document crimes against
4 humanity and violations of human rights;

5 (D) to combat corruption and improve the
6 transparency and accountability of government
7 institutions; and

8 (E) to support the efforts of state and
9 independent media outlets to broadcast, dis-
10 tribute, and share accurate and reliable news
11 and information with the people of Libya.

12 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after
14 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
15 of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
16 the United States Agency for International Develop-
17 ment, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
18 committees a strategy to carry out the activities de-
19 scribed in subsection (a). The strategy shall be up-
20 dated, including with benchmarks of progress made
21 to date, and resubmitted to the appropriate congres-
22 sional committees not later than 15 days after the
23 scheduling of credible presidential and parliamentary
24 elections in Libya.

1 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
3 propriate congressional committees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
5 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate; and

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the House
9 of Representatives.

10 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
12 appropriated to the Secretary of State \$23,000,000
13 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024 to carry
14 out subsection (a).

15 (2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Any ex-
16 penditure of amounts made available to carry out
17 subsection (a) shall be subject to the notification re-
18 quirements applicable to—

19 (A) expenditures from the Economic Sup-
20 port Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign
21 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(c));
22 and

23 (B) expenditures from the Development
24 Assistance Fund under section 653(a) of the

1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2 2413(a)).

3 **SEC. 303. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITU-**
4 **TIONS TO ADVANCE LIBYAN ECONOMIC RE-**
5 **COVERY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR FI-**
6 **NANCIAL MANAGEMENT.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in
8 consultation with the Secretary of State and the Adminis-
9 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
10 velopment, shall instruct the United States Executive Di-
11 rector at each international financial institution to use the
12 voice, vote, and influence of the United States to support
13 a Libyan-led process to develop a framework for the eco-
14 nomic recovery of Libya and improved public sector finan-
15 cial management, complementary to United Nations-led
16 peace efforts and in support of the future establishment
17 of democratic institutions and the rule of law in Libya.

18 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The framework de-
19 scribed in subsection (a) shall include the following policy
20 proposals:

- 21 (1) To reunify the leadership and operations of
22 Libya's key economic ministries and institutions.
- 23 (2) To improve the efficiency and reach of Lib-
24 yan government programs that support poverty alle-
25 viation and a social safety net.

1 (3) To assist in reconciling the public accounts
2 of national financial institutions and letters of credit
3 issued by private Libyan financial institutions.

4 (4) To restore the production and efficient
5 management of Libya's oil industry, including re-
6 building any damaged energy infrastructure.

7 (5) To promote the development of private sec-
8 tor enterprise.

9 (6) To improve the transparency and account-
10 ability of public sector employment and wage dis-
11 tribution.

12 (7) To strengthen supervision of and reform of
13 Libyan financial institutions to minimize corruption
14 and ensure resources equitably serve the people of
15 Libya.

16 (8) To eliminate exploitation of price controls
17 and market distorting subsidies in the Libyan econ-
18 omy.

19 (c) CONSULTATION.—In supporting the framework
20 described in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury
21 shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each
22 international financial institution to encourage the institu-
23 tion to consult with relevant stakeholders in the financial,
24 governance, and energy sectors.

1 (d) DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL IN-
2 STITUTION.—In this section, the term “international fi-
3 nancial institution” means the International Monetary
4 Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
5 opment, European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
6 ment, International Development Association, Inter-
7 national Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment
8 Guarantee Agency, African Development Bank, African
9 Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-
10 American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Co-
11 operation and Development in the Middle East and North
12 Africa, and Inter-American Investment Corporation.

13 (e) TERMINATION.—The requirements of this section
14 shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2024.

15 **SEC. 304. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE LIBYAN**
16 **PEOPLE.**

17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
18 gress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
19 Treasury, and the Attorney General should advance a co-
20 ordinated international effort—

21 (1) to carry out special financial investigations
22 to identify and track assets taken from the people
23 and institutions of Libyan through theft, corruption,
24 money laundering, or other illicit means; and

25 (2) to work with foreign governments—

1 (A) to share financial investigations intel-
2 ligence, as appropriate;

3 (B) to oversee the assets identified pursu-
4 ant to paragraph (1); and

5 (C) to provide technical assistance to help
6 governments establish the necessary legal
7 framework to carry out asset forfeitures.

8 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The coordinated inter-
9 national effort described in subsection (a) should include
10 input from—

11 (1) the Office of Terrorist Financing and Fi-
12 nancial Crimes of the Department of the Treasury;

13 (2) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
14 of the Department of the Treasury; and

15 (3) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery
16 Section of the Department of Justice.

17 **SEC. 305. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR LIBYA.**

18 (a) APPOINTMENT.—The President, in consultation
19 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
20 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
21 national Development, and the Chairmen and Ranking
22 Members of the appropriate congressional committees,
23 should consider appointing a Special Envoy for Libya.

24 (b) DUTIES.—The Special Envoy should coordinate
25 with foreign officials from the countries listed in section

1 102(a)(1) who are working on their governments' Libya
2 policy, the European Union, the United Nations, and
3 other relevant multilateral organizations to advance a sus-
4 tainable diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya.

5 (c) TERMINATION.—The position of Special Envoy
6 should remain filled until such time as a diplomatic solu-
7 tion to the conflict in Libya is reached.

Last week, the Trump Administration hosted key officials from the Libyan Government in Washington, DC to discuss the security situation there as well as joint efforts against ISIS. The discussions were extremely productive. Following them, the two governments issued the important joint statement attached.

As you will see, this statement makes crystal clear that:

- The Libyan Government is the official Government of Libya recognized by the US and the UN.
- The unwarranted, stalled offensive by Haftar and his mislabeled “Libyan National Army” against the Libyan Government and Tripoli must stop immediately.
- The US and the international community must work to stop foreign interference, particularly from Russia, fueling Haftar’s destructive offensive.

This meeting and joint statement were extremely important.

As always, please call or email with any thoughts, suggestions, or questions.

Thank you.

Deirdre

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